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WHEN LAWS GOVERN LAWS: A REVIEW OF THE 2018
DISCUSSIONS OF THE GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION AND REGULATION OF LETHAL
AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS
By Caitlin Mitchell1
In 2017, nearly 100 CEOs, CTOs, and other professionals, including Elon
Musk, co-founder and CEO of Tesla Motor, addressed an Open Letter to the
United Nations Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons in an attempt to implore countries to protect innocent populations
from the horror that may ensue without proper regulation and security of
lethal autonomous weapons systems. In 2018, roughly 3,000 Google
employees signed a letter protesting the company’s involvement in a Pentagon
program that uses artificial intelligence to interpret video imagery and which
could be used to improve the targeting of drone strikes. In 2019, the United
Nations Chief warned that lethal autonomous weapons systems are
“politically unacceptable, morally repugnant and should be prohibited by
international law.” While these pleas for regulations governing lethal
autonomous weapons systems are being heard, the United Nations is slow to
act on assuaging these fears due to the lack of consensus among countries on
what LAWS really are or how best to govern them. This article seeks to provide
clarity regarding the discussions that occurred during the 2018 Conference of
the Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons (the “Conference”) as
requested by the United Nations. Primarily, this article will analyze the likely
success of the proposals put forward by Countries pertaining to the creation
of regulations to govern the development and use of LAWS under the values of
International Humanitarian Law.

1
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INTRODUCTION
In 2017, nearly 100 CEOs, CTOs, and other professionals, including
Elon Musk, co-founder and CEO of Tesla Motor, addressed an Open Letter to
the United Nations Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons in an attempt to implore countries to protect innocent populations
from the horror that may ensue without proper regulation and security of lethal
autonomous weapons systems.2 This letter specifically stated that lethal
autonomous weapons systems “threaten to become the third revolution in
warfare” and “once developed, they will permit armed conflict to be fought at
a scale greater than ever, and at timescales faster than humans can
comprehend.”3
In 2018, roughly 3,000 Google employees signed a letter protesting the
company’s involvement in a Pentagon program that uses artificial intelligence
to interpret video imagery and which could be used to improve the targeting
of drone strikes.4 In the letter, the employees specifically stated, “we believe
that Google should not be in the business of war,” a concern developed due to
the contract Google currently has with the pentagon to develop improvements
to analysis of drone video which would be used on autonomous weapon
systems in the future. These specific improvements could be used to pick out
human targets for strikes and better protect civilians to reduce the accidental
killing of innocent people.5
This article seeks to provide clarity regarding the discussions that
occurred during the 2018 Conference of the Convention of Certain
Conventional Weapons (the “Conference”) as requested by the United
Nations. Primarily, this article will analyze the likely success of the proposals
put forward by Countries pertaining to the creation of regulations to govern
the development and use of LAWS under the values of International
Humanitarian Law. Although this article was written prior to the 2019
Conference, many of the opinions contained within still apply now. The 2019
Conference yielded no decisive relief either in terms of legal provisions or
policy goals6, and prompted the United Nations Chief, António Guterres, to
2
An Open Letter to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, to the
United Nations (August 21, 2017) (on file with author); An Open Letter to the United Nations
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, FUTURE OF LIFE INSTITUTE (last visited May 25,
2020), https://futureoflife.org/autonomous-weapons-open-letter-2017/?cn-reloaded=1.
3
An Open Letter to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, to the
United Nations (August 21, 2017) (on file with author).
4
‘The Business of War’: Google Employees Protest Work for the Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES (April
4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/google-letter-ceo-pentagonproject.html.
5
Id.
6
Hayley Evans and Natalie Salmanowitz, Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: Recent
Developments, LAWFARE (March 7, 2019, 3:28 P.M.), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lethalautonomous-weapons-systems-recent-developments; Alexandra Brzozowski, No Progress in
UN talks on regulating lethal autonomous weapons, EURACTIV (November 22, 2019),
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state, “autonomous machines with the power and discretion to select targets
and take lives without human involvement are politically unacceptable,
morally repugnant and should be prohibited by international law.”7
Contrary to popular belief, the greatest threat to the future of warfare is
not the image of the terminator, but the use of fully autonomous lethal weapon
systems that are hyper efficient, hyper accurate, and capable of independently
deciding to attack and kill a combatant during battle. While many may not
grasp the full understanding of what a lethal autonomous weapon system
(“LAWS”) is on reading this phrase, this emerging technology is the subject
of roughly four years of tumultuous discussion between countries who are
parties to the Geneva Convention and additional treaties.8 However, at the
conclusion of the most recent meetings in August of 2018, these countries are
still no closer to regulating such weaponry due to one fundamental problem:
there is no universally agreed upon definition of what a LAWS is or would be
capable of because they have yet to be created.9
This article will first provide a brief summarization of the
classifications of levels of autonomy for weapon systems which will create a
foundation of knowledge regarding the technology involved in later
discussion. Next, the following section provides the relevant tenets of
International Humanitarian Law that currently govern weapons and applies to
the creation of new weapons, such as lethal autonomous weapon systems.
After this review, the current, overarching issues with lethal autonomous
weapon systems, as discussed in previous meetings of the Conference, are
described as a foundation for the analysis of the country positions from 2018.
Finally, each country’s position at the conclusion of the 2018 Conference are
analyzed to determine their respective success under the tenets of International
Humanitarian Law.
I.

WHAT ARE LETHAL AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS?

There is no uniform definition as to what constitutes a Lethal
Autonomous Weapon System because there is a lack of understanding
regarding what technology is utilized in the creation of LAWS or what they
are capable of.10 The primary reason for this, as of February 2019, is that there
is no publicly known instances of a fully autonomous LAWS having been
https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/no-progress-in-un-talks-on-regulatinglethal-autonomous-weapons/.
7
Autonomous weapons that kill must be banned, insists UN chief, UN NEWS (March 25, 2019),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/03/1035381.
8
Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots, HUM. RTS. WATCH (November 19, 2012),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-against-killer-robots.
9
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems at the First and Second U.N. GGE Meetings, LAWFARE
(April 9, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-first-andsecond-un-gge-meetings.
10
Id.
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completed.11 While many active participants in the discussion surrounding
LAWS, both proponents and critics, have much to say on what LAWS will
likely be capable of, the uncertainties pose significant issues when attempting
to regulate this particular weapon using the traditional strategies of
International law.12
Therefore, this section provides a brief understanding of the definitions
used by the international community to differentiate between levels of
autonomy in weapons and examples of the varying degrees of autonomous
weapons available to the military today. By defining these levels, a distinction
emerges between the most common level of autonomy in weapons used by the
military and fully autonomous weapons that will require new laws to ensure
careful management of their use in wars.
Due to the complexity of the concept of autonomy, many scholars state
it is preferable to think of the autonomy of machines on a spectrum.13 While
several attempts have been made to define a primary, or universally
understood, spectrum, the most commonly used version, and the version that
this paper chooses to implement, is titled the Boyd Cycle, or “OODA Loop.”14
Created by Air Force Pilot and Military Strategist John Boyd, the OODA Loop
provides insight into the complicated process of decision-making while using
language shared by engineers, the military, and the general public.15
The OODA Loop evaluates human decision-making based on the
following steps: Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act.16 As a demonstration of
these steps, the following is an explanation of how a person may use the above
steps to make a decision:
A person first observes the world around her, gathering data about her
environment through the array of human senses. Second, she orients herself,
or interprets the information she has gathered. Third, she weighs the potential
courses of action based on the knowledge she has accumulated and decides
11
Id.; Throughout the later years of 2019, it appears that there were still no fully autonomous
LAWS that were complete and operational. However, multiple countries, including the United
States and Russia, are attempting to solidify the use of and are currently investing in the creation
of these weapons. See Damien Gayle, UK, US and Russia among those opposing killer robot
ban, THE GUARDIAN (March 29, 2019, 7:25 P.M.),
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/mar/29/uk-us-russia-opposing-killer-robot-ban-unai.
12
Interview by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) with Ambassador
Amandeep Singhl Gill, Chairman, Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting
Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injuries or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
(September, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OoenCZZKtdU.
13
Alan L. Schuller, At the Crossroads of Control: The Intersection of Artificial Intelligence in
Autonomous Weapon Systems with International Humanitarian Law, 8 HARV. NAT’L. SEC. J.
379, 392 (2017).
14
Id.
15
William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding “the Loop”: Regulating the Next
Generation of War Machines, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 1139, 1145 (2013).
16
Id.
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how to act. Fourth and finally, she acts, or executes the decision she has
made.17
Although this model is an oversimplification of the overall complexity
of this thought process, it offers clear delineations in the process of decisionmaking that can be applied to technological systems based on their ability to
follow these steps and, eventually, make decisions.18 Therefore, when
considering the OODA Loop, this indicates that an autonomous weapon,
generally, is a machine capable of sensing and manipulating its surroundings
with limited to no human control by observing the conditions around it,
orienting itself with internal programming and incoming data, and deciding
on the appropriate course of action.19
Scholarly works use the OODA Loop as a way to distinguish between
how much interaction humans have with varying weapons, and rely on the
following phrases to describe differing levels of autonomy: (i) "In the Loop”
refers to a situation where the human operator plays an integral role in the
operation of the machine – the machine cannot accomplish its task without
human involvement;20 (ii) “On the Loop” refers to a situation where the human
monitors the system and can intervene before the system takes action;21 and
(iii) “Out of the Loop” refers to a situation where the human plays no role in
the machine’s execution of its task.22
In addition to using the terminology specified above, several definitions
have been supplied that informally adopt the OODA Loop, but do not
explicitly use Boyd’s terminology.23 For instance, the United States
Department of Defense has defined an autonomous weapon system as:
A weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets
without further intervention by a human operator. This includes humansupervised autonomous weapon systems that are designed to allow human
operators to override operation of the weapon system but can select and
engage targets without further human input after activation.24
This specific definition would be considered a system with a human “on
the loop” because the weapon can perform the target selecting process, but
still be superseded by a human operator prior to any action on the part of the
machine.
17

Id.
Id.
19
ARMIN KRISHNAN, KILLER ROBOTS: LEGALITY AND ETHICALITY OF AUTONOMOUS
WEAPONS 5 (Ashgate Publishing Limited et al., 2009).
20
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher M. Ford, Autonomous Weapons and International Law, 69
S.C. L. REV. 413, 423-24 (2017).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
U.S. Dept. of Def., Directive 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS, 13-14 (Nov.
21, 2012, incorporating Change 1, May 8, 2017),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf.
24
Id.
18

2020]

GOVERNANCE OF LAWS

413

Overall, the fundamental difference between semi-autonomous,
autonomous, and fully autonomous25 weapon systems is the ability for the
weapon, without human initiation or intervention, to identify, target, and
attack a person or object.26 For example, United States forces in 2013
implemented Aegis, an autonomous weapon at sea, which is designed to
defend against short notice ballistic missile attacks.27 The difference between
Aegis and a fully autonomous weapons system is that Aegis is supervised by
a human with the ability to override the systems capabilities, if necessary, and
would be classified as a system with a human “on the loop.”28
While this is a condensed version of the technological explanation the
reader deserves with regard to this topic, this article is primarily focused on
the international legal discussion surrounding fully autonomous weapon
systems, or weapon systems where a human is “out of the loop.” Before
broaching the analysis regarding this fundamental question, a brief summary
of the international laws applicable to this discussion is contained within the
following section and reviews their relation to autonomous weapons, rather
than the full autonomous capabilities foreshadowed to be included in the
creation and implementation of LAWS.
II.

THE LEGAL HISTORY SURROUNDING WEAPONS USED IN WAR

Although International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) is a well-established
body of law, the basic principles and guidance provided by the Geneva
Convention as well as subsequent international treaties governs all weapons
created since its inception.29 Article 52 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Convention states, "In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are
limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make
an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time,

25
Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon Systems
and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT’L. SEC. J. 231, 236 (2013) (There is discussion
about whether a fully autonomous system is ever entirely human interaction free. Either the
system designer or an operator would theoretically at least have to program it to function and an
operator would have to decide to employ it in a particular battlespace; but if technology
continues to improve the initial system designer interface may be the only aspect still required
and a fully autonomous system would be able to both turn itself on and off as well as conduct its
normal military operations).
26
Id. at 235.
27
Lockheed Martin, Aegis Combat System, (last visited May 25, 2020),
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/aegis.html.
28
Id.
29
Geneva Conventions, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL (last visited
May 25, 2020),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/geneva_conventions_and_their_additional_protocols.
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offers a definite military advantage."30 As stated under this definition,
‘objects’ includes a wide range of weapons, such as knives, guns, landmines,
and, eventually, LAWS.31
As a result, despite the lack of new regulations specific to the use and
nature of LAWS as weapons of war, the current legal structure established by
existing IHL applies to their implementation until new laws are established by
the international community. Therefore, this section begins with the current
understanding of IHL and what concepts apply to LAWS if they were to be
created tomorrow. Next, this section will review additional components of
IHL that are relevant to the legal discussion surrounding LAWS. Finally, prior
to delving into the ongoing discussions among the international community in
2018, this section will review primary concerns regarding LAWS and possible
violations of IHL, which are necessary for a discussion of the proposed
solutions to the lack of regulations specifically created for LAWS.
A. Fundamental International Humanitarian Law Principles
To begin, the Geneva Convention, and subsequent additional
amendments, are the primary documents governing international war.32 The
purpose of the Conventions is to provide minimum protections, standards of
humane treatment, and fundamental guarantees of respect to individuals who
become victims of armed conflicts.33 As a whole, the Geneva Conventions
espouse four fundamental principles which govern both military weapons used
and conduct in war: Humanity, Distinction, Proportionality, and Military
Necessity.34
Article 35 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of
August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflict (“Additional Protocol I”), provides an interpretation of the principle
of Humanity by prohibiting the use of “weapons, projectiles and material and
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering.”35 The International Court of Justice further interpreted the
principle of humanity, stating that weapons are “prohibited to cause

30
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S., Art. 52.
31
Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, International Group of
Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Chps.
4-5 and accompanying commentary (2013).
32
Geneva Conventions, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL (last visited
May 25, 2020),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/geneva_conventions_and_their_additional_protocols.
33
Id.; For this article, we are primarily concerned with Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Convention, passed in 1977, which specifically provided increased protection for civilians,
military workers, and others that may find themselves involved in International Armed Conflict.
34
Id. at 21 (Art. 35).
35
Id.

2020]

GOVERNANCE OF LAWS

415

unnecessary suffering to combatants” and that countries are “accordingly
prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating
their suffering.”36 As an example, weapons such as poison/poisonous gas
violate the principle of humanity by causing unnecessary suffering outside that
required to ‘disable the enemy.’37 A weapon system is properly categorized as
one that inflicts unnecessary suffering “only if it is inevitably or in its normal
use has a particular effect, and the injury caused thereby is considered by
governments as disproportionate to the military necessity for that effect.”38
Article 48 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention embodies
the principle of distinction by stating, “in order to ensure respect for and
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the
conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”39 In
addition, according to the International Court of Justice, States must never
make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons
causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering.40 Ultimately,
the principle of Distinction requires military forces to respect and protect
civilians and civilian objects regardless of what they believe is necessary to
accomplish their military objectives.41
The next principle, Proportionality, is set forth in Articles 51(5)(b)
and 57(2)(a)(iii) of Additional Protocol I, and prohibits “an attack which may
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive42 in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”43
‘Excessive,’ as referred to in the Articles above, is considered to be a case-bycase assessment that is evaluated in terms of its reasonableness given the
attendant circumstances.44 To lawyers and law students, it is similar to the
legal standard for negligence in Tort law, and resembles the standard of care
that a reasonably prudent person would observe under a given set of
circumstances.45 The larger conclusion to be gained from Proportionality is
36

1996 I.C.J. 95.
JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 36
(James Crawford &
John S. Bell eds., 2004).
38
ALAN APPLE ET AL., OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 14 (William Johnson & Wayne Roberts
eds., 2013).
38
Protocol I, supra note 26 at Art. 48.
39
Id.
40
1996 I.C.J. 95.
41
Id.
42
Emphasis provided by the Author.
43
Protocol I, supra note 26 at Arts. 51 and 57.
44
Schmitt, supra note 21 at 16.
45
Reasonable, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL (last visited May 25,
2020), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/reasonable.
37
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that the greater the probability of an anticipated military advantage likely to
accrue from an attack, the more the law of armed conflict will tolerate the
expected collateral damage.46
Finally, the principle of Military Necessity permits measures which
are necessary to accomplish legitimate military objectives and are not
otherwise prohibited by IHL.47 As discussed by many international law
scholars, the only legitimate purpose is to weaken the military capacity of the
other parties to the conflict and, therefore, requires a balance between military
necessity and humanitarian exigencies.48 As an example, a weapons strike
lacking military advantage but causing harm to civilians or civilian objects
would be considered an outright violation of this principle.49
These four principles form the foundation of IHL and should be
heavily considered in the implementation of new solutions to regulate LAWS.
In addition to these fundamental values, there are additional clauses that are
mentioned in international discussion regarding the legality of LAWS which
are discussed in further detail below.
B. Additional Clauses Establishing Weapons Reviews Under IHL
While the fundamental principles of IHL are provided above, there is an
important procedural component of IHL upon the creation of a new weapon.
Without a review of whether the weapon would be likely to violate IHL
(known commonly as a “weapons review”), there is no stop-gap between the
implementation of a new weapon and the possibility of military actions that
violate IHL principles.50 As a result, additional clauses provided by Additional
Protocol I establish weapons reviews that should be conducted by States to
determine the legality of new weapons.
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I provides that, “in the study,
development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of
warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether
its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this
Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High
Contracting Party.”51 To further clarify, a LAWS is a means of warfare and if
a foreign government uses such a weapon during the course of combat, it
would then become a method of warfare. In summary, Additional Protocol I
requires that any entity that creates or plans to use new weapons in war is
46
Schmitt, supra note 21 at 16. Note: there is a large problem with this conclusion given that
autonomous weapon systems may not be capable of this calculation (like determining what
military advantage there is, etc.).
47
Military Necessity, Glossary, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, (last visited January 27,
2019), https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/military-necessity.
48
Id.
49
Protocol I, supra note 26 at Arts. 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(iii).
50
Losing Humanity, supra note 5 at 21; Tallinn Manual, supra note 27 at 128.
51
Protocol I, supra note 26 at Art. 36.
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required to consider the applicability of and likelihood that the weapon in
question, a means of warfare, will violate IHL.
States which have agreed to abide by Additional Protocol I must conduct
the above reviews of any weapon developed, but non-abiding states are not
required to conduct such reviews.52 Despite this, many in the international
community agree it is in the best interest for all countries to conduct such
reviews and promote compliance with the fundamental principles of IHL.53
However, previous investigations into State compliance were disappointing
since many non-abiding states have not formally created a procedure for these
reviews and indicated that they rarely occur.54
The Martens Clause further expands upon the weapons review
standard provided by Article 36 of Additional Protocol I by providing
application even in the absence of relevant treaty law.55 The Martens Clause
states, “in cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and
authority of the principles of international law derived from established
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public
conscience.”56 As a result of the combination of the Martens Clause and
Article 36 above, it is highly unlikely that a weapons system, including
autonomous ones, would not violate applicable treaty and customary law, but
nevertheless be unlawful based on the Martens Clause.57
To briefly summarize the rules stated above, weapons reviews should
begin in the early stages of development, address all configurations of the
weapons, consider such key principles as those mentioned in subsection (a),
and conclude by reviewing whether the weapons’ use is contrary to the
dictates of public conscience prior to implementation to establish that a
weapon meets the legal requirements necessary for implementation in war.58
Finally, in addition to the rules and clauses stated above, LAWS are governed
by treaties passed that supported the implementation of IHL and provided new
guidance on weapons with improved technology since the creation of the
Geneva Convention and Additional Protocols.
52

Tallinn Manual, supra note 27, at 128.
Report of the 2018 Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies
in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, CCW/GGE.1/2018/3 (April 9-13, 2018
and August 27-31, 2018).
54
Id.
55
Protocol I, supra note 26 at Art. 1.
56
Id. (The text of the clause refers to "cases not covered by this Protocol or by other
international agreements."); Emphasis added by the author.
57
Id.
58
Losing Humanity, supra note 5; Int’l. Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on the
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 39, (last
accessed May 25, 2020), http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750004?OpenDocument
(According to the ICRC, the Martens Clause “should be seen as a dynamic factor proclaiming
the applicability of the principles mentioned regardless of subsequent developments of types of
situation or technology.”)
53
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C. The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects
The purpose of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, etc. (the “Convention”) is to ban or
restrict the use of specific types of weapons that are considered to cause
unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians
indiscriminately.59 The Convention only contains general provisions because
the Additional Protocols prohibit or restrict specific weapons or weapon
systems.60
As originally adopted, the Convention contained three protocols
prohibiting the use of weapons that employ fragments not detectable in the
human body by X-ray (Protocol I); regulating the use of landmines, boobytraps and similar devices (Protocol II); and limiting the use of incendiary
weapons (Protocol III).61 New protocols and amendments have recently been
added to expand the scope of and strengthen the Convention as a response to
the increasing human toll by specific weapons as well as to apply the
Convention in situations of non-international armed conflict.62 The sample
changes described above are two of many that demonstrate the dynamic nature
of the Convention because the document takes into account future
developments in the nature and conduct of armed conflict.63
In the 2017 session of the Group of Governmental Experts related to
emerging technologies in the area of LAWS (the “GGE”), the group stated
that the CCW, in particular, offers an appropriate framework for dealing with
LAWS.64 According to the report issued at the conclusion of proceedings, “the
Convention’s modular and evolutionary character, the balance it seeks to
strike between humanitarian considerations and military necessity as well as
the opportunity it offers to engage multiple stakeholders make it an ideal
platform for reaching a common understanding on this complex subject.”65
Despite this affirmative belief that the Convention and IHL principles
are the most effective solution to regulate LAWS, there are various substantial
apprehensions concerning both the application of existing laws and the
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effectiveness of new laws.66 Therefore, in 2013 the United Nations tasked a
subgroup of High Contracting Parties to the Convention, the Group of
Governmental Experts (“GGE”), with exploring and agreeing on possible
recommendations related to regulation of LAWS with a focus on IHL
compliance.67 Although these discussions have taken place for several years,
the sessions held in 2018 began to solidify the issues related to LAWS under
the overarching values of the Convention and Additional Protocols.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE PRIMARY ISSUES REGARDING THE GOVERNANCE
OF LAWS BY IHL AS ADDRESSED BY THE 2018 DISCUSSIONS OF THE
GGE

Scholars have suggested since 2012 several reasons why regulation of
LAWS with current IHL regulations and values would be ineffective and
unable to protect civilians and combatants.68 Reviewing the extensive list of
these proposed concerns would take several pages of material and vast
amounts of technological knowledge not discussed in this article. Therefore,
a narrow list of these issues will be discussed in the context of the agenda
items proposed by the 2018 discussions from the Conference of the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Group of Government Experts
on LAWS (the “Conference”).69 These topics specifically include the
following four central concepts, discussed in further detail below. While each
of these topics had additional sub-parts not addressed here, the general
understanding of each issue is described to facilitate later analysis.
A. The Characterization of LAWS
The GGE chose to make the characterization of LAWS a primary issue
of discussions to promote a common understanding of concepts and
characteristics relevant to the objectives and purposes of the CCW.70 Although
specific delegations believed that an agreed upon definition was essential to
fully address the risks posed by these systems, countries such as the United
66
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States believe that the absence of such an agreement should not hinder
progress on the determination of policy choices.71 Moreover, the technical
characteristics related to the fully autonomous aspects of these systems, such
as self-learning, should be further studied in conjunction with the spectrum of
autonomy since different functions could have different degrees of
autonomy.72
Taking these considerations into account, the GGE focused on four
broad approaches to weapon characterizations that were referred to over the
course of discussions, including:
1. The Separative approach: Characteristics and concepts not
relevant to the objectives and purposes of the CCW are set
aside, while gathering the characteristics and concepts that are
definitely relevant to the objectives and purposes of the CCW;
2. The Cumulative approach: Categories of characteristics are
added to a master list and then evaluated against certain
technical, legal-humanitarian or political-security criteria to
assess their relevance to the objectives and purposes of the
CCW;
3. The Accountability approach: Considers a set of
characteristics related to the functions and type of decisions
handed over to machines, and which avoids using levels of
autonomy and other technical characteristics or categories
related to the loss of human control;73
4. The Purpose oriented and effect-based approach: Focuses
on desirable and undesirable consequences of possible lethal
weapons systems based on emerging autonomous intelligent
systems and technologies.74
In relation to those approaches, delegations wanted to reinforce that
physical or technical attributes alone would not be sufficient to characterize
LAWS and that the GGE should focus on the characteristics related to the
human element in the use of force.75 This was an attempt to build
understanding about the human-machine interface throughout the lifecycle of
weapons systems.76
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The approaches provided above are of paramount importance for the
development of regulations because, without understanding the technology
itself, traditional approaches to the application of International law would no
longer work. As mentioned by the Chairman of the GGE, Amandeep Singh
Gill, traditional weapons experts focus on the weapon itself, such as landmines or incendiary weapons, and draft what they believe to be appropriate in
the context of the capabilities and characteristics of the weapon.77 Without
such information, Countries will be unable to provide solutions that will effect
change and will only expose themselves to the risk of over or under-regulating
LAWS prior to their use. Such over or under-regulation may hinder the ability
for LAWS to be properly governed in their use or for the GGE to ensure the
protection of civilians and combatants under the balancing between military
action and civilian protection, provided by the Convention.
B. The Human Element in the Use of Lethal Force
As part of discussions surrounding this particular issue, delegations
agreed that further consideration of the human element in the use of lethal
force, aspects of human-machine interaction in the development, deployment
and use of emerging technologies in the area of LAWS was needed for
effective and comprehensive regulation.78 Moreover, the GGE underlined the
need to apply a human-centric focus in discussing technical characteristics of
LAWS due to the human-weapon interaction being necessary for compliance
with IHL, despite the difficulties associated with human control.79
Of substantial importance to the technological discussion of LAWS was
the human control exerted in the research and development stage, including
such activities as weapons reviews.80 As noted during discussions, and for
clarification, the research and development phase involves teams of software
developers who jointly create algorithms, technical experts who design and/or
“train” the software, and engineers responsible for the hardware and the
integration of the software.81 In addition, the GGE posited that in future
meetings additional attention should be paid to the feasibility of some
measures of human control, supervision or judgment, keeping in mind the
relevant qualitative requirements such as reliability, predictability and
explainability, or auditability.82
As briefly discussed in the IHL review under Section II above, the values
posited by the Geneva Convention and Additional Protocols consider the
ability for humans to conduct the balancing between all four factors in the heat
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of combat. While countries do not fully comprehend whether LAWS will be
independently capable of conducting this type of analysis, the GGE, in an
attempt to retain a human element of the use of LAWS, is continuing the
application of IHL principles. Weapons with various levels of autonomy up to
this point all have at least an “on the loop” human component, one that can
prevent the final stages of attack if a military use were to deviate from the
proper course. As a result, it is imperative that a human aspect of the use of
LAWS be retained, for the time being, for IHL to apply. As discussed later,
the necessity for a human element to be retained in future applications of new
International laws to LAWS is slightly more complex and merits additional
analysis in the context of specific country positions.
As a result of the above concerns, some delegations reaffirmed that the
regime of international responsibility and accountability for the use of force
in armed conflict fully applies when emerging technologies are employed.83
Other delegations viewed that new legally-binding provisions were necessary
for addressing the humanitarian and international security challenges posed by
these technologies.84 Still other delegations supported the proposal from the
2017 discussions to establish a political declaration, which would state that
humans would be responsible for any final decisions made by and maintaining
control over LAWS.85 Despite the diversity of proposed solutions to attempt
to regulate LAWS, the majority of countries believe that not only are existing
or new laws capable of regulating these technologies, but that they are
necessary to ensure that they are properly used and controlled.86
The agenda items stated above are only the beginning of the extensive
issues which necessitate discussion on an international scale. However, based
on the overarching themes of the discussions from the 2018 negotiations and
presentations, each country supported a solution in an attempt to gain a deeper
understanding of the laws required when addressing LAWS as a means of
warfare. Each of these positions will be described and analyzed in turn to
determine the likely success of the proposed solutions under the governing
values of IHL, via the original Geneva Convention, Additional Protocols, and
the CCW.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO REGULATION OF LAWS BY
COUNTRY IN CONNECTION WITH IHL AND CONVENTION PRINCIPLES

Despite a lack of consensus on the definition of LAWS and previous
concerns established by both scholarly works and 2016 and 2017 discussions
among world leaders, in 2018, the GGE began to finalize the possible
solutions that would help address the foregoing concerns by countries as well
83

Id.
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
84

2020]

GOVERNANCE OF LAWS

423

as effectively regulate the use of LAWS in the future.87 This section will
address country positions in the following order: Venezuela and associated
countries of the Non-Aligned movement, the United States, the Russian
Federation, and China.
A. Venezuela
On behalf of countries which are members of the Non-aligned movement
(NAM), Venezuela believes that a legally binding instrument is necessary for
the regulation of LAWS and, pending the conclusion of such a document, that
all states should declare moratoria on the further development and use of
LAWS.88 As a foundation for this belief, Venezuela stated that it is of the view
that LAWS raise a number of ethical, legal, moral and technical, as well as
international peace and security related questions, which should be thoroughly
deliberated and examined in the context of international law to identify
concrete policy options for addressing them.89
Venezuela further stated that it is pleased that a general consensus
developed among High Contracting Parties stating that all weapons, including
those with autonomous functions, must remain under the direct control and
supervision of humans at all times, and must comply with international law.90
Although IHL does not strictly discuss the moratoria of weapons in
pursuit of effectively regulating them, this is not the traditional approach
exercised by the United Nations when dealing with emerging technologies.91
Specifically, with the evaluation of several previous weapons that fall under
the CCW and precede the discussion of LAWS, this does not often occur due
to the weapon already being in active use in military combat.92 However, the
fundamental question that should be considered is whether or not this is a
sufficient way to regulate the ‘types’ of emerging technology that are being
developed, not strictly including LAWS.
The foreshadowed use of evolution by LAWS to improve and better
serve military goals is indicative of a new aspect of weapons that will need to
87
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be evaluated and regulated without denying its existence.93 While this
technology is new, the concept of programming and ‘teaching’ weapons to
improve accuracy and performance is not.94 As a result, the best approach to
fully understanding the scope of LAWS is to allow for their development
without condoning the use of LAWS in combat. Without a deeper
understanding of what this technology could develop into and the scope of
such autonomous capabilities as evolution, IHL will continue to apply only in
theory and will not be able to encompass the full breadth of capabilities that
LAWS will potentially retain.
Therefore, this solution, while ideally the best way to prevent atrocities
from occurring due to illegal uses of LAWS in the field, will not allow for the
GGE to create the most effective or comprehensive regulations pertaining to
LAWS or even emerging technologies to come. While innocent lives were
taken in previous instances of weapons, such as land mines, being evaluated
during combat, this is an opportunity for the GGE to focus on allowing
technology to continue to progress, but with limitations that will continue to
balance the values espoused by the Convention. If the GGE develops LAWS
keeping both military application and civilian protection in mind, they will
effectively be performing the balancing required under current International
laws and allowing themselves the best opportunity in the future to regulate
emerging technologies properly.
In addition, this working paper specifically highlights the general
consensus that LAWS must be under the direct control and supervision of
humans while being used. While this requirement does provide some security
that humans could intercede and prevent a LAWS from acting, this is not the
primary focus of the values of international law and presents a distinction
between the values as posited by the IHL and those created during the GGE
Conference.
All the values described above under the IHL focus on the impact to
those on the receiving end of the use of weapons such as LAWS. The IHL’s
primary goal is to protect both combatants and civilian populations from
unnecessary and excessive force used by weapons, and, while it is evident the
GGE is attempting to enable those values by creating an interim consideration,
mandating human control and supervision does not eliminate some of the
primary reasons why these specific values were chosen.
Each of these values focuses on the impact of the weapon’s attack, i.e.,
the extent of the damage to combatants or civilians if the weapon chooses or
accidentally takes a life. While requiring a human to be “on the loop” limits
the extent that these weapons will attack when not desired, this requirement
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does not reduce the ultimate scope of harm to the enemy or innocent civilians
during a war.
In particular, this was the concern of the CEOs and Engineers provided
in the 2017 letter to the GGE – the result of the creation of this technology is
not, at this moment, a concern that these weapons will attack various
individuals without the operation of humans. Rather, the concern focuses on
the weight of the eventual change to war as a larger concept. War is at risk of
becoming increasingly faster, efficient, and, as previously discussed in
scholarly articles and GGE discussions alike, inhumane. A human may not
stop the attack of a LAWS when necessary, and the impact of such a weapon
is what should most concern the GGE.
The International community has reached a consensus that LAWS must
require human observation, and that a definition should be formulated to better
understand what these weapons will be capable of. However, the focus of the
position supported by Venezuela seeks only to halt the progress of technology
in an attempt to better understand and eventually create international laws to
govern it. This approach both ignores the speed with which technology
develops and the central focus of international law – the values established by
IHL center around the impact to combatants and civilians in times of war, not
the weapon itself. This conclusion indicates that the likelihood of Venezuela’s
position successfully leading to the development of sufficient laws for the
governance of LAWS is remote because, without a clear understanding of
what the regulation seeks to accomplish, Venezuela will only be attempting to
halt the inevitable.
B. The United States
According to the working paper submitted to the GGE, the United
States’ position on LAWS seeks to avoid any attempt to stigmatize or ban
emerging technologies.95 Rather, the U.S. argues that countries should
encourage such innovation that furthers the objectives and purposes of the
Convention and, because of this goal, there should be no restrictions on the
development of such weapons from the GGE.96 The primary reason the U.S.
supports this unrestricted development is the pursuit of fully protecting
civilians from unnecessary suffering, one of the main purposes of IHL.97
Emerging technologies in the field of LAWS have the potential to
improve quality of life as well as prove effective at saving lives during combat
by improving the accuracy of military technology.98 Moreover, the U.S. put
95

Humanitarian Benefits of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon
systems, submitted by the United States of America, CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.4 (April 9-13,
2018).
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.

426

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 36

forward several examples of ways in which emerging technologies could be
used to reduce risk to civilians, including incorporating autonomous selfdestruct, self-deactivation, or self-neutralization mechanisms and increasing
awareness of civilians and civilian objects on the battlefield.99 While these
examples were discussed by the U.S. working paper with additional detail,
there are fundamental technological and IHL related issues that accompany
these suggestions.
As noted by the U.S. working paper, technology is often applied in
innovative ways that are wholly unlike previous applications.100 This is of the
utmost concern for the U.S. position because, despite the ability to point to
some benefits of LAWS that we believe may exist and help reduce
unnecessary civilian suffering, the primary concern of the principle of
humanity, these examples only deepen concerns that LAWS will not comply
with IHL.101 For instance, the creation of a self-destruct mechanism further
implicates the ability for LAWS to distinguish between civilians and
combatants and would be considered under the principle of Distinction, a
principle which has required several discussions among countries to
conceptually understand. Therefore, the approach that the U.S. took in their
working paper only creates a false sense of security when proposing
regulations for LAWS because this strategy does not allow for the best
regulations to be created.
Ultimately, the working paper focuses on the potential of emerging
technologies in the area of LAWS without fully addressing the additional
complications posed by the advanced technology in question and what LAWS
will likely be capable of. Although countries do not have a full understanding
of LAWS as technology, focusing on the benefits of LAWS without
identifying key characteristics that will be associated with this specific
weapon does not enable the GGE to effectively discuss or create legislation
surrounding their use during war. Moreover, although the examples provided
do relate to the balancing as proposed in the Convention as well as the
traditional Additional Protocol values, these are only a small portion of the
technology itself. Providing small safety mechanisms, while important, does
not ensure that the full weapon meets the values of IHL, specifically values
such as the balancing the weapon will have to perform itself. If a LAWS
cannot grasp the concept of proportionality without assistance from a human,
the safety mechanisms that will prevent final attack without approval will not
justify the use of the weapon, regardless of the situation.
By saying that states should “encourage such innovation that furthers the
objectives and purposes of the Convention,” the U.S. is only postponing the
99

Id.
Id.
101
Id.
100

2020]

GOVERNANCE OF LAWS

427

need to address the fundamental problem of defining the values that should
govern LAWS, or even defining LAWS themselves for the regulations to
successfully apply, indicating that their approach to the regulatory framework
is more deferential than other countries. Without active engagement with
policy discussions and an in-depth discussion of what will allow this
technology to sufficiently uphold the values of IHL, the U.S. position will be
unsuccessful for lack of any real proposal related to the suggested approach
by the GGE.
C. The Russian Federation
The working paper provided by the Russian Federation specifically takes
a focus on the definition of LAWS prior to the implementation of a legal
solution.102 This is primarily due to the Russian belief that the current high
functioning weapons should not be classified as LAWS.103 In addition, to aid
in the development of technologies with improved accuracy due to higher
levels of autonomy, States should rely on their own standards for critical
functions such as aim identification and hit command, while maintaining
significant human control.104 Finally, the Russian Federation commented that
the definition and basic functions agreed upon by the GGE should be guided
by the ultimate goal of LAWS, but specific forms and methods of such control
should remain at the discretion of States.105
Although the initial approach taken by the Russian working paper
resembles many other country policies, it should be noted that the suggestion
of independent state standards and specific guidance by the ultimate goal of
LAWS, rather than specific characteristics of LAWS themselves, are both
interesting for the discussions that took place in 2018.
Until this portion of the article, the legal foundation for the relevant
analysis has centered on the IHL values that govern all nations, including those
that did not agree to abide by the Additional Protocols. Despite the ability to
unilaterally refrain from agreeing to implement international policies that may
not be aligned with country policy beliefs, the Geneva Convention, Additional
Protocols, and the subsequent CCW all have priority in application for
weapons used in warfare due to its impact on countries both in and out of
combat. However, countries can choose to go “above and beyond” the call of
the international regulations set forward and effectively establish their own
standard of conduct for international conflicts, so long as the language and
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goals of the policy do not conflict with previously recognized norms.106 As
discussed in Section II subpart to Article 36 and the Martens Clause, nonabiding countries are not required to conduct such reviews, but the
International community as a whole suggests that voluntary completion of
these weapons reviews is in the best interest of all nations.107
While this presents an opportunity for larger countries such as Russia
and the United States to structure their own standards of review, without input
from the international community, it also allows for smaller countries, or those
without the means to have reviews that are thorough, to avoid having to do so.
This poses a significant risk to the international community because without a
standardized approach to reviews, a country deciding to avoid an intricate
review will increase the likelihood of unnecessary casualties or excessive
force. Ultimately, it will be important to have both a standardized,
international norm for the review of methods and controls of LAWS as well
as discretion for states to improve upon those norms if need be. A baseline
standard will provide the most stability for international negotiations
regarding LAWS because, while many countries perform different tasks in
various ways, an international agreement among countries will promote
consistent application of laws and, hopefully, regular compliance with IHL.
Next, the Russian working paper focused on the characterization of
LAWS by stating that the regulations implemented should focus on the ‘goals
of LAWS’ rather than other aspects that have been discussed thus far. While
the language used to describe this concept is different than previously
reviewed, the fundamental statement centers around the idea of the purpose
for the use of LAWS specifically, rather than just focusing on either the
technology or the overarching military goals. As a point, it may be more
effective for the military to use LAWS instead of a tank to provide a tactical
advantage depending on the circumstances.
This is a valuable suggestion that should be considered in addition to the
characteristics of LAWS because it will provide the GGE an added layer of
reasoning for determining how the regulations should be written and
structured. IHL provides that the principle of military necessity must be
considered when declaring whether a weapon is legal for use in war.108
Without consideration of what LAWS will eventually be used to achieve in
combat, it will be more difficult for LAWS to abide by this legal standard. As
briefly described by the United States, the GGE has discussed benefits of the
use of LAWS, such as the ability to accurately identify a civilian when

106

Schmitt, supra note 21 at 25; Protocol I, supra note 26 at Art. 36.
Tallinn Manual, supra note 27, at 128.
108
Protocol I, supra note 26 at Art. 36.
107

2020]

GOVERNANCE OF LAWS

429

searching for an enemy combatant to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties.109
These benefits are also the primary reason why military necessity of use will
change – it will be not only easier, but safer, to use LAWS instead of previous
weapons of choice that have the risk of human error.
While the removal of human control for the LAWS’s decision to act is
still a controversial issue under IHL, Russia poses an important and necessary
addition to the characteristics of LAWS because the reasons for use will
become evident due to the inherent facts about the operation and technology
involved in LAWS. In addition to the other factors mentioned above, the
discussion of the ultimate military purpose of LAWS will increase the
successful application of the regulatory solutions to similar emerging
technologies in the future and should be taken into consideration with each
new weapon introduction.
D. The People’s Republic of China
China began their working paper by summarizing their basic position
and preliminary views, which included five basic characteristics which they
believe should be included in the final, working definition of LAWS: (1)
Lethality – sufficient payload and for means to be lethal; (2) Autonomy –
absence of human intervention and control during the entire process of
executing a task; (3) Impossibility for termination – once started there is no
way to terminate the device; (4) Indiscriminate effect – the device will execute
the task of killing and maiming regardless of conditions, scenarios and targets;
(5) Evolution – meaning that through interaction with the environment, the
device can learn autonomously, expand its functions and capabilities in a way
exceeding human expectations.110
In addition, weapons reviews, including reviews on the research,
development and use of new weapons, cause China concern because these
policies and practices differ significantly among countries, as previously
demonstrated by adherence to pre-existing weapons review standards.111 It is
also difficult to have a uniform standard to apply to these reviews, and this
indicates that any initiative or proposal based on such reviews can hardly
solve, in a fundamental way, the concerns that LAWS create.112
To begin, the success of regulations for LAWS centers around the factors
provided by China and, in addition to the suggestions made by the Russian
working paper, these suggestions from China provide the GGE the best chance
to consider all the aspects of LAWS and emerging technologies of a similar
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nature. The combination of the factors above – lethality, autonomy,
impossibility for termination, indiscriminate effect, and evolution – provide a
comprehensive description of the full capabilities and characteristics of
LAWS by taking into account the likely issues with compliance under IHL.
By considering each of these factors in turn, the GGE will be able to clearly
articulate the concerns and possible illegal nature of LAWS if need be.
Moreover, these factors will provide a definitive analysis of the
especially contentious values under IHL due to the presence of autonomy,
impossibility for termination, and evolution. Each of these contributes to the
concerns that arise under the IHL principles of distinction and proportionality
because the level of autonomy in weapons, as well as LAWS being capable of
evolution, limits the likelihood that LAWS will fully understand the balancing
that takes place during a typical war decision-making process. By requiring
that these factors be considered with every instance of emerging technology
that resembles laws, the GGE will be able to fully evaluate the likely risks to
IHL values and, therefore, whether the weapon itself is illegal.
In addition, the China working paper posed an additional concern
regarding the position detailed in the Russian working paper regarding
independent state decisions for the forms and methods of control of LAWS.
China asks whether a uniform standard will enable consistent methods of
control, such as weapons reviews, and whether these reviews will ultimately
help solve IHL compliance issues. While China does not present a solution for
what would qualify as an acceptable uniform standard for procedures such as
weapons reviews, the list of characteristics of LAWS provided above as well
as added consideration of what states would like to independently decide will
provide the structure needed to develop a uniform standard that will encourage
compliance and support. Moreover, as Article 36 and the Martens Clause
already provide a rough framework for weapons reviews that have not proved
effective in the past, the GGE may use this previous experience to modify and
create better, more effective standards that will promote IHL compliance by
all countries, including those that are non-abiding to the original Additional
Protocol.
In their working paper, China presented many aspects of what this article
believes will lead to a successful regulation of LAWS, including adapting to
the key ideas behind the operation and use of LAWS, addressing previous
concerns with weapons reviews which are utilized to determine IHL
compliance, and asking whether such measures will address the concerns
created by LAWS. By focusing on these pieces of information in the context
of the values provided by IHL, the success of such a proposal in creating
effective and promising legislation is more likely than previous proposals.
While each country presented different concerns and a solution that directly
related to that concern, China adapted to include all important concerns, all
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important uncertainties, and attempt to consolidate them for the basis of
regulation of LAWS. Knowing the boundaries of what LAWS must comply
with under existing IHL, the GGE may determine what will need to be
modified for compliance under new laws, whenever they are finalized.
CONCLUSION
The regulation of LAWS and the international community’s
disagreement over how best to address the issues above is a complex topic.
While there may not be LAWS that exists at this moment in time, that is not
to say the progression of technology will not produce one in the near future.
The suggestions brought forward by countries at the end of the 2018
Conference are both promising and troublesome. Many countries are focusing
on different pieces of a much larger problem and the GGE has yet to settle on
a specific definition of what LAWS ‘are.’ Despite this, after four years of
deliberations, the GGE identified in 2018 a small list of the potential core
aspects of LAWS needed to regulate this type of technology in the future.
Therefore, the proposals detailed above provide insight into the likely success
of these determinations, and, under existing IHL principles, determining
whether the eventual regulations for LAWS will be comprehensive in nature
and effective at protecting civilians and combatants under International law.

